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1. Introduction. 
  In last decades Canadian, US and Mexican agricultural markets have experienced a growing 
integration in terms of trade and investment flows following the adoption of the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Agrofood trade grew reflecting national comparative advantages.  
The Canadian agrofood sector tends to export more cold weather crops such as wheat, barley, oats, 
canola, flax and lentils.  The US sector specializes in production and trade of corn and soybean, 
while in Mexico one observes more labor intensive crops such as fruits, vegetables, and 
horticultural products [Doan et al, 2004].  The agricultural political reform triggered by the NAFTA 
agreement, leading to the reduction of subsidies and import tariffs, is the main thrust beyond the 
growing integration of agricultural markets in North America. However, the reduction of tariff 
measure has stressed trade frictions created by agrofood technical measures.  For example, 
Thilmany and Barrett [1997] noted how in the post NAFTA North American dairy trade: “Mexican 
dairy-product standards are strict but inconsistently enforced, which poses an obstacles for some 
dairy producers and processors” [p.105].  Another example is represented by the US-Mexican 
Avocado trade dispute settled in 1997.  Finally, the recent Canadian BSE episode has evidenced the 
fragility of the economic integration of these markets and the difficulties in managing food risk.  
   Agrofood technical measures are provisions introduced to regulate quality product attributes. 
According to a recent report from OECD, the impact on trade of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) is 
the result of four different effects: trade creation, trade reduction, trade prohibition and trade 
diversion.  The notion of trade creation refers to the possibility that NTMs may create trade, 
because they, addressing market failures, may stimulate the demand.  NTMs may provide public 
goods to consumers, such as protection of human, animal and plant health [Maskus et al., 2001].  In 
addition, NTMs may reduce the asymmetry of information in the market. For example, labeling 
requirements can ease the comparison of quality attributes of agro-food products, or turn credence 
attributes, such as organic or GMO production, into search attributes. Trade reduction and   2 
prohibition refer to the negative impact of NTMs on the production function of foreign suppliers; 
however, if production costs increase to a prohibitive level, trade is inhibited.  Finally, NTMs may 
impose different compliance costs on importing countries to an extent that trade is diverted from 
one country to another.  Production costs may increase because of changes in production process or 
raw materials requirements, whereas transaction costs may raise because of delays, redundant tests 
and inspections at the border of importing countries. 
  The aim of this study is to evaluate the extent and the impact of non-tariff measures (NTM), 
major emphasis is on technical measures in the North America agricultural market integration. The 
paper is organized in six sections.  First, trade and welfare markets effects of agrofood technical 
measures are highlighted.  A review of previous studies follows.  In this section strengths and 
weakness of the approach adopted to evaluate the economic impacts are discussed.  Next, we 
illustrate the gravity methods approach. The forth section describes the data used in this 
investigations.  Econometric specifications and results follows. Some concluding remarks end this 
paper.  
 
2. Economics of agrofood technical measures. 
  Complex are the welfare and trade impacts of agrofood technical regulations.  In general it is 
observed that compliance to idiosyncratic technical measures imposes additional costs to exporting 
firms, increasing unambiguously producer surplus in the importing countries, but at cost of reducing 
trade and the overall net social welfare.  On the other hand, these regulations may stimulate the 
importing demand addressing specific consumer’s concerns.  If this is the case, measures on quality 
product attributes may create trade and enhance the net social welfare.  These instances are 
illustrated in figure 1 with the help of a three-panel diagram. 
   When the importing country introduces a technical regulation, the supply of its trading 
partner shifts on the left from S2 to S
’
2, and the excess of supply from ES to ES
’, since firms in the   3 
exporting nation face additional production costs to comply with the new regulation.  Consequently 
international price raises from Pw to P’w and trade volume declines from q to q’.  In the importing 
country, consumers lose economic surplus for an amount equal to the area abji, while producers see 
their surplus to increase by abgf.  In the exporting country, consumers loose the area mnqp, whereas 
the impact on producers depends on size of the trapezoid mnut with respect to the area styw; if nutm 
is larger than styw, producer’s surplus increases, otherwise it declines. However, this eventual gain, 
together with the area abgf, is not enough to compensate consumers of both countries. Therefore, 
unambiguously the introduction of this type of technical measures reduce the aggregate welfare. 
  On the other hand, if this measure stimulates consumer’s demand in the importing country, 
it may possible to enhance the net social welfare.  For example, a labelling requirement, reducing 
the asymmetry of information in the market, may shift consumer’s demand in the importing country 
as illustrated in figure 1 by D
’
1.  In this condition, market price moves from Pw to P
’’
w, and trade 
volume increases from q to q
’’.  In the importing country, producers gain a surplus equal to the 
trapezoid achf, while consumers increases their economic surplus of an amount equal to the area 
delk at cost of the trapezoid achf.  In the exporting country producers gain movt at cost of styw, 
while consumers lose the area morp. Therefore, a technical measures addressing consumer’s 
concerns may create trade and positive variation of economic surplus at aggregate level. 
 
Figure 1.  Trade and welfare effects of agrofood technical measures.   4 
 
 
3. Previous studies. 
  Partial equilibrium, computational general equilibrium (CGE) and econometric models are 
the three main approaches adopted to assess the economic impact of technical measures, and more 
in general of non-tariff measures, on agrofood trade.  Calvin and Krissoff [1998] appraise the 
welfare effect of Japanese phytosanitary requirements applied to US export of apples in a partial 
equilibrium model.  In their analytical framework the trade impact of Japanese technical regulations 
is calculated from the observed price difference between the Japanese domestic price and the US 
landed price after accounting for existing import tariffs.  The idea is that non-arbitraged price gaps 
indicate the presence of trade barriers.  Results indicate that Japanese technical regulations have a 
detrimental effect on US exporting firms.  The major strength of this approach is the ability to 
incorporate in the model specific characteristics of technical measures.  On the other hand, the 
conceptual framework is based on the strong assumption that no other significant factors contribute 
to the price gaps among trading nations.  Indeed, imperfect competition in the international market, 
pricing-to-market strategy, monopoly price discrimination, and more in general the imperfect 
transmission of market information can contribute to the observed price gaps across trading 
partners.  
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  Bradford [2004] evaluates the welfare impact of non-tariff measures affecting world 
agrofood trade in a general equilibrium framework.  The model is build on GTAP data version 5 
(1997) considering 16 regions
1 and 33 sectors, 14 of them representing the agrofood industry
2.   The 
impact of non-tariff measures is evaluated from observed producer price gaps across trading 
partners.  Simulation results indicate that the removal of all agrofood non-tariff measures would 
generate worldwide an equivalent variation of 91.5 billion of US$.  One of the advantages of CGE 
models is the ability to assess the welfare impact of food non-tariff measure considering the 
interdependences with other economic sectors.  However, the price gap approach is subject to the 
critiques that non-tariff measures are not the only factor contributing to price wedges in the 
international markets. 
  Econometric analysis on the trade impact of standards is based on extension of traditional 
gravity models, which regress trade flows among trading partners on their respective economic size 
(i.e. GDP) and geographic distance as proxy of  transportation costs.  Since this intuition is derived 
from the Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, the term ‘gravity’ is used in the economic 
literature to recall it.  Swann, Temple and Shurmer [1996] investigate the impact of shared and 
idiosyncratic standards on UK and German bilateral trade over the period 1985-1991.  Standards are 
matched to 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) British net exports, exports and imports. 
The PERINORM database is source of information on standards.  Results suggest that British 
standards have a positive effect on both UK exports and imports, while German standards reduce 
British exports, suggesting a protective impact. The assumptions underlying the gravity model 
about perfect international product substitutability, perfect commodity arbitrage and purchasing-
power parity among trading partners limits the interpretation of results [Bergstrand, 1985]. 
                                                 
1 The regions take in consideration are: 1) Australia, 2) Japan, 3) Korea, 4) China, 5) rest of Asia, 6) Canada, 7) United 
States, 8) Brazil, 9) rest of Latin America, 10) Germany, 11) Italy, 12) Netherlands, 13) United Kingdom, 14) Rest of 
Europe, 15) Middle East, 16) Rest of World. 
2  The agrofood sector accounted in the analysis are: 1) live animals, 2) other animals products, 3) bovine cattle, sheep, 
goat, and horse products; 4) other meat products; 5) fish, 6) dairy products, 7) fruits, nuts and vegetables, 8) other crops, 
9) vegetable oils and fats, 11) processed rice, 12) sugar, 13) beverage and tobacco products , 14) other agriculture and 
15) other food products.    6 
  The difficulties associated to the assessment of the economic impacts of agrofood technical 
measures emerge clearly form this short review of the literature.  The price wedge approach is 
subject to the critique that it may be misleading to attribute residual price differences across trading 
partners to non-tariff measures, after accounting for transportation costs and import tariffs.  In fact, 
other factors such as imperfect commodity arbitrage, imperfect competition and imperfect 
transmission of market information can be other relevant factors.  On the other hand, the 
employment of gravity models as they stand is subject to critiques, too.  In fact, the assumption 
underlying these equations limits the interpretation of results. Furthermore, it may be misleading to 
evaluate the impact of technical measures using simple count variables of all applied provisions, 
because it is implicitly assumed that each type of measures has the same impact. 
 
4. Gravity model. 
  In this investigation gravity equations are used to assess the impact of technical measures on 
agrofood trade within the NAFTA region.  In order to address previous concerns, the assumptions 
on perfect international product substitutability, perfect commodity arbitrage and purchasing-power 
parity among trading partners are relaxed.  Furthermore, different count variables are specified to 
evaluate the distinct trade impact of  the different types of measures.  Finally, to assess whether the 
impact of technical measures depends on the country adopting them, count variables are country-
specific.  





b4uij  [1] 
where Xij is the value of export from country i to country j, Yi and Yj are the dollar value of 
nominal GDP respectively in country i and j, Dij is the geographic distance of trading partners, Aij 
are factors either aiding or resisting trade between i and j, and uij is a log-normally distributed error 
term with E(ln uij ) = 0,  b’s are parameters to be estimated [Bergstrand, 1985].   7 
  Gravity models became quite popular in trade economics because of their success in 
explaining bilateral trade since their first empirical application by Tinbergen in 1962.  However, 
only recently their microeconomic foundations have been discussed [Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 
1985 and 1989].  In particular, Bergstrand [1985] shows that equation [1] can be derived by a world 
trade general equilibrium model of under some restrictive assumptions.  It is assumed “perfect 
substitutability of goods internationally in production and consumption, perfect commodity 
arbitrage, zero tariffs, and zero transportation costs” [p.477].  These assumptions are often violated 
in international markets as outlined by empirical findings.  Carew [2000] reveals the existence of 
imperfect transmission of exchange rate across international markets; Kravis and Lipsey [1984], 
and Richardson [1978] pin point that often commodity arbitrage is imperfect; Fackler and Goodwin 
[1992], and Milkovic [1999] provide empirical evidence of the violation of the Law of One Price in 
international agrofood markets. 
  Relaxing those assumptions and accounting for cross-country differences in factor 












         · (Excij)
b10(Aij)
b11uij  [2] 
where L is the population in country i an j, DF is the GDP deflator of country i and j, Ep is the 
export price index in county i, Ip is the import price index for country j, Excij is the exchange rate 
(i.e. i-currency value of a unit of j’s currency), b’s are parameters to be estimated. 
  Following Swann, Temple and Shurmer [1996], we consider count variables on 
idiosyncratic standards applied at the border of the importing country as factors either aiding or 
resisting trade.  However, to account for the fact that different technical measures can have different 
welfare and trade impacts we consider count variables for three different technical measures: 
product technical standards (STD), labelling requirements (LAB) and tests, inspection and 
quarantine measures (INSP).  Furthermore, since economic effects of these measures may depend 
on the country adopting them, these count variables are country-specific: STDCAN, LABCAN,   8 
INSPCAN, STDUS, LABUS, INSPUS, STDMEX, LABMEX, INSPMEX.  The CAN, US and MEX 
subscripts distinguish the borders where that particular technical measures apply. For example, 
when the importing country is Canada STDCAN, LABCAN and INSPCAN variables count respectively 
the number of technical standards, labelling requirements and tests, inspection and quarantine 
requirements faced by either US or Mexican agrofood exports, while STDUS, LABUS, INSPUS, 
STDMEX, LABMEX, INSPMEX variables are all set equal to zero. The same procedure applies when 
either USA or Mexico is the importing country. Equation [3] represents the final model adopted in 
this investigation: 
  ln Xij=b0+ b1
 ln(Yi)+ b2 ln(Yi/Li)+ b3 ln(Yj)+ b4 ln(Yj/Lj)+ b5 ln(DFi)+ b6 ln(DFj)+ 
  + b7 ln(Ep)+ b8 ln(Ip)+ b9 ln(Excij)+b10 ln(Dij)+ b11 STDCAN+ b12 LABCAN +  
  + b13 INSPCAN+ b14 STDUS+ b15 LABUS+ b16 INSPUS+ b17 STDMEX+ b18 LABMEX+  
  + b19 INSPMEX + ln uij  [3] 
 
5. Data. 
  Information on trade, non-tariff measures and macroeconomic variables have been gathered 
from different sources of information. The United Nation’s COMTRADE database and the United 
Nation Conference on Trade and Development’s TRAINS database are sources of information on 
agrofood trade flows and technical measures in NAFTA countries, while the IMF International 
Financial Statistics and OECD National Accounts provide information about yearly GDP, GDP 
deflator, per capita GDP, exchange rate, import unit value indexes and export unit value indexes for 
Canada, USA and Mexico from 1999 to 2003.  Geographical distances among capital cities of 
NAFTA member countries were obtained from a geographic atlas.  
  UNCTAD’s TRAINS database is a source of information on Canadian, US and Mexican 
technical measures applied to agrofood imports in 1999.  This information refers to number and 
typology of technical measures applied to each tariff line.  Since each reporting country has its own   9 
national classification criteria for technical measures and merchandises, common classification 
systems are warranted.  In this investigation we adopt the following criteria.  First, we re-classify 
Canadian, US and Mexican agrofood technical measures in three different categories: product 
standards (STND), labelling (LAB) and inspection (INSP) requirements. Second, we convert 
national tariff lines in subheadings of the 1996 revision of the harmonized system (HS1996)
3. This 
conversion is possible considering that the national tariff line systems refer to HS.  Finally, to avoid 
double counting we standardize the number of technical measures applied for each its subheading 
with respect to the number of tariff lines within it. 
  The UN COMTRADE database provides information on export values of agrofood products 
for Canada, USA and Mexico for the year 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.  Agrofood products 
are identified by all subheadings (6-digit) from chapter 01 to chapter 22 in the 1996 revision of the 
Harmonized System. A total of 12628 records were collected.  We proceed then to concord each 
record of export from country i to country j with the respective count variables of technical 
measures. 
 
6. Econometric specifications. 
  Our sample is an unbalanced panel data of Canadian, US and Mexican agrofood exports 
within the NAFTA area over the period 1999-2003.  Because of these features, two alternative 
econometric specifications can be estimated.  One can assume that the intercept is constant across 
                                                 
3 “The Harmonized System (officially Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System) was adopted by the 
Customs Co-operation Council in June 1983, and the International Convention on the Harmonized System (HS 
Convention) entered into force on 1 January 1988 (HS88). In accordance with the preamble to the HS Convention, 
which recognized the importance of ensuring that HS be kept up to date in the light of changes in technology or in 
patterns of international trade, HS is regularly reviewed and revised. The headings and subheadings of HS are 
accompanied by interpretative rules, and section, chapter and subheading notes, which form an integral part of HS and 
are designed to facilitate classification decisions in general and to clarify the scope of the particular headings or 
subheadings. It is recommended that countries use HS for the collection, compilation and dissemination of international 
merchandise trade statistics” [United Nations Statistics Division, 2005]. The HS1996 contains 5113 subheadings and 
1241 headings, grouped into 97 chapters. Agrofood products are from chapter 01 to 22 (see table 1), and 6-digit is the 
maximum level of product differentiation.  For example the subheading HS 010111 indicates the merchandise “horse 
alive”, while HS 220900 stands for “vinegar and other products with acetic acid”. 
   10 
importing countries (equation [4])
4 or under the alternative hypothesis the intercept is country-
specific (equation [5]), where b is 1·3 vector of importing country-specific intercepts
5.  A simple F-
test can be used to evaluate whether the hypothesis of common intercept is rejected or not.  If H0 is 
not rejected then a basic pooled or total regression model is estimated (equation [4]), and hence, the 
panel data structure is ignored. 
  ln Xijt=b0+ b1
 ln(Yit)+ b2 ln(Yit/Lit)+ b3 ln(Yjt)+ b4 ln(Yjt/Ljt)+ b5 ln(DFit)+ b6 ln(DFjt)+ 
  + b7 ln(Ept)+ b8 ln(Ipt)+ b9 ln(Excijt)+b10 ln(Dij)+ b11 STDCAN+ b12 LABCAN +  
  + b13 INSPCAN+ b14 STDUS+ b15 LABUS+ b16 INSPUS+ b17 STDMEX+ b18 LABMEX+  
  + b19 INSPMEX + ln uijt  [4] 
Instead if the hypothesis of common intercept is rejected, then a fixed effect model is estimated 
(equation [5]).   
ln Xijt=b0+ b1
 ln(Yit)+ b2 ln(Yit/Lit)+ b3 ln(Yjt)+ b4 ln(Yjt/Ljt)+ b5 ln(DFit)+ b6 ln(DFjt)+ 
  + b7 ln(Ept)+ b8 ln(Ipt)+ b9 ln(Excijt)+b10 ln(Dij)+ b11 STDCAN+ b12 LABCAN +  
  + b13 INSPCAN+ b14 STDUS+ b15 LABUS+ b16 INSPUS+ b17 STDMEX+ b18 LABMEX+  
  + b19 INSPMEX + ln uijt  [5] 
 
7. Empirical Results. 
  Tables 1 - 4 present the coefficient estimates for 23 gravity equations considering all 
subheadings of 22 agrofood commodity groups according the 1996 revision of the HS, and each 
single commodity group.  For the 23 gravity equations the R
2’s range from 0.07 to 0.41.  The panel 
data structure has been ignored in all estimated equations, since the hypothesis of a country-specific 
intercept has been always rejected at 5% of significant; the F-test upper tail area is reported. 
                                                 
4 The only difference between equation 3 and 4 is that export flow and macroeconomic variables have also a time 
dimension. 
5 It is worth noting how b may or may not correlated with remaining variables on the right hand side of equation [5]. 
The Hausman test statistic can be used to assess whether b is correlated or not.   11 
  Other two statistical tests have been performed.  One evaluates whether cross-country 
differences in capital and labor endowments can help to explain agrofood trade patterns. In this 
case, the relevant hypothesis is to test whether the coefficients of per capita GDP of importing and 
exporting countries are jointly equal to zero or not H0: b5 = b6 =0.  This hypothesis has been 
rejected for agrofood commodities, and for single commodity groups such as fish and crustacean 
(HS 03); live trees and other plants (HS06); edible vegetables (HS07); edible fruits and nuts 
(HS08); coffee, tea and spices (HS09); lac, gums and resins (HS13); vegetable plaiting materials 
(HS14); animal/vegetable fats and oils (HS15); preparation of fish and meat (HS 16); cocoa and 
preparations of cocoa (HS18); preparation of cereal, flour, pastrycook products (HS19); preparation 
of vegetables and fruits (HS20); miscellaneous edible preparations (HS21); beverages, spirits and 
vinegar (HS22).  The estimated coefficient for the importer’s per capita GDP (b5) is always 
negative and statistically significant for most of these commodity groups predicting that consumers 
consider these products necessities, while the sign of the exporter’s per capita GDP (b6) is negative 
and statistically significant for all of them indicating that production of these products tend to be 
labor intensive.  These results seem to be plausible indicating the presence of comparative 
advantages for the Mexican and Canadian agrofood industries in specific sectors with respect to the 
US ones. 
  The other hypothesis appraises whether cross-country differences in prices play a role in 
trade patterns. The relevant hypothesis is to test whether the coefficients of import unit value index, 
export unit value index and exchange rate are jointly equal to zero: b7 = b8 = b9 =0.  This hypothesis 
is not rejected for trade in all agrofood commodities, and for the following commodity groups: fish 
and crustacean (HS03); edible vegetables (HS07); edible fruits and nuts (HS08); cocoa and cocoa 
preparations (HS18); preparation of cereal, flour, starch/milk, pastrycook products (HS19); 
preparations of vegetables and fruits (HS20). However, all estimated coefficients are not 
statistically different from zero.  Therefore, we can conclude that cross-country price differences do 
not play a role in explaining agrofood trade among NAFTA members.  This implies that the   12 
NAFTA agreement stimulated the integration of Canadian, US and Mexican economies and the 
price convergence across their national market, even though, these regional trade agreement involve 
countries with different degree of development. 
  The coefficient estimate for importer income (b1) is positive and statistically significant for 
trade in all agrofood commodities, and for meat and edible meat offal (HS02); dairy products, birds’ 
eggs, natural honey (HS04); products of animal of origin (HS05); malt, starches, inulin, wheat 
gluten (HS11); lac, gums, resins (HS13); sugars and sugar confectionery (HS17); beverages, spirits 
and vinegar (HS22).  Thus, export volume increases as importer income raises.   
  The coefficient estimate for exporter’s income (b2) is positive and statistically significant for 
trade in all agrofood commodities, and for live animals (HS01); meat and edible meat offal (HS02); 
products of animal of origin (HS05); malt; starches, inulin, wheat gluten (HS11); lac, gums, resins 
(HS13); sugars and sugar confectionery (HS17); beverages, spirits and vinegar (HS22), indicating 
that the elasticity of substitution among importables is greater than 1.  Thus, consumers choose 
among various foreign suppliers according to their relative prices, ruling out the possibility of 
product differentiation based on country of origin (i.e. the elasticity of substitution among imported 
products equals 0). 
  The estimated coefficient for the geographic distance (b10) is not significant for most 
commodity groups  Instead, it is negative and statistically significant for trade in all agrofood 
commodities, and for preparations of cereals, flours pastrycook products (HS19); miscellaneous 
edible preparations (HS21), indicating that an increase in the geographic distance, a proxy for 
transportation costs, reduces trade flows. While this result seems plausible, puzzling may appears 
the positive and statistically significant relationship between trade flows and the geographic 
distance for live animals (HS01); meat and edible meat offal (HS02); product of animal origin 
(HS05); sugars and sugar confectionery (HS17).  However, this result is an indication that for these 
commodity groups a large share of trade occurs along the Canadian/US border rather than along the 
Canadian/Mexican border or along the US/Mexican border. In fact, the distance variable has been   13 
specified considering the geographic distance among capital cities within NAFTA countries, and 
the distance between Ottawa/Mexico City is larger than Washington, DC/Mexico City, which in 
turn is larger than Washington DC/Ottawa. 
  For what concerns the trade impact of agrofood technical measures, the results indicate that 
Canadian technical measures have a prevalent trade reduction effects.  In fact, the estimated 
coefficients for inspection, testing measures and product standards are negative and statistically 
significant for trade in all agrofood commodities. 
  More complex is the picture for technical measures applied at the US border. US product 
standards (STDUS) have a prevalent trade creation effect, that is, the stimulus in the importing 
demand, because STDUS addresses consumer’s concerns, outweighs the supply reduction of 
exporting firms, resulting from higher production costs.  In fact, the coefficient estimate (b14) is 
positive and statistically significant for trade in all agrofood commodities, and for edible vegetables 
(HS07); lac, gums, resins (HS13). 
  Inspection and testing measures applied at the US border (INSPUS) show both trade creation 
and trade reduction effects. The estimated coefficient (b15) is positive and statistical significant for 
trade in single commodity groups such as live animals (HS01); fish and crustacean (HS03); oil seed, 
oleaginous fruits (HS12); sugars and sugar confectionery (HS17), indicating that the expansion of 
importing demand outweighs the supply reduction of exporting firms.  On the other hand, b15  is 
negative statistically significant for edible vegetables (HS07); coffee, tea and spices (HS09); 
preparations of cereals, flour, starch/milk, pastrycook products (HS19).  In these instances the trade 
reduction effect prevails. 
  The coefficient estimate of US labeling requirement (b16) is positive and statistically 
significant only for trade in all agrofood commodities, suggesting the prevalence of the trade 
creation effect.  However, when the attention is focused on agrofood trade of single commodity 
group the trade reduction effect is predominant.  In fact, b16 is negative and significant for meat and   14 
edible meat offal (HS02); dairy products, birds’eggs, natural honey (HS04); preparation of meat and 
fish (HS16).  
  Complex is also the impact of Mexican technical measures on agrofood trade. In fact, it is 
not possible to generalize unambiguously their impact since trade creation and reduction effects 
depend on the commodity groups to which they are applied. Mexican product standards (b17) have 
positive and statistically significant impact for trade in all agrofood commodities, and for live 
animals (HS01); meat and meat edible offal (HS02); products of animal origin (HS05); live tree and 
other plants, cut flowers (HS06); edible vegetables (HS07); coffee, tea and spices (HS09); cocoa 
and coca preparations (HS18); preparations of vegetables and fruits (HS20).  Thus, trade creation 
prevails impact for these commodity groups.  On the other hand, b17 is negative and statistically 
significant for trade in fish and crustacean (HS03); edible fruits and nuts (HS08); vegetable planting 
materials (HS14); animal/vegetal fats and oil (HS15); preparation of meat and fish (HS16); 
preparations of cereal, flour, starch/milk, pastrycook product (HS19); miscellaneous edible 
preparations (HS21); beverages, spirits and vinegar (HS22).  
  Mexican inspection and testing measures have a trade creation effect when they are enforced 
on the following product categories: dairy products, birds’ eggs, natural honey (HS04); cereals 
(HS10); malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten (HS11); animal/vegetables fats and oil (HS15); 
preparation of meat and fish (HS16); cocoa and cocoa preparations (HS18); preparation of cereal, 
flour, starch/milk, pastrycook products (HS19); miscellaneous edible preparations (HS21); 
beverages, spirits ad vinegar (HS22).  Instead, a trade reduction effect prevails when they are 
applied to live animals (HS01); product of animal origin (HS05); vegetables plaiting materials 
(HS14). 
  Mexican labeling requirements have a statistically significant trade creation impact on 
preparation of fish and meat (HS16); preparation of cereal, flour, starch/milk, pastrycook products 
(HS19); miscellaneous edible preparations (HS21).  Instead, the trade reduction effect is prevalent   15 
for live tree and other plants, cut flowers (HS06); edible vegetables (HS07); cereals (HS10); cocoa 
and cocoa preparations (HS18); preparation of vegetables and fruits (HS20). 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
  This study models the agrofood trade among NAFTA countries over the period 1999-2003 
using gravity models  in order to assess the trade impact of agrofood technical measures.  Cross-
country variations in labor and capital endowments are the major shaping agrofood trade. In fact, 
production and trade specialization tend to be labor intensive.  Furthermore, estimated elasticity 
among importables suggests that consumers choose among various foreign suppliers according to 
their relative prices, ruling out the possibility of product differentiation with respect to the country 
of origin.   
  The rejection of the hypothesis that cross country price differences play a role in NAFTA 
agrofood trade, and when this hypothesis is not rejected the non significance of estimated 
parameters, indicate that NAFTA agreement stimulated the integration of Canadian, US and 
Mexican economies and the convergence of prices across their national market even though, this 
regional trade agreement involves developed and developing countries. 
  Complex is the picture emerging from the evaluation of the trade impact of technical 
agrofood technical measures.  Overall a trade creation effect seems to prevail, even though trade 
creation and reduction effects from technical measures cannot be unambiguously generalized, since 
these effects depend on the commodity groups to which they apply.  Therefore, consumer’s 
concerns, rather than protectionist reasons, fuel the demand of agrofood technical measures within 
NAFTA trade area. 
   
  
   16 
Table 1. Estimated results 
    HS 01  HS 02  HS 03  HS 04  HS05 
Product Category  All agrofood product  Live animals  Meat and edible meat offal  Fish and crustacean  Dairy product; birds' 
eggs; natural honey 
Products of animal 
origin 
Obs  12628    304    939    1495    538    285   
R
2  0.12    0.24    0.07    0.21    0.22    0.12   
H0: pooled vs panel  
(upper tail area)  0.12    0.83    1.00    0.92    0.72    0.50   
H0: b3 = b4 =0  
(upper tail area) 
0.00    0.09    0.12    0.04    0.14    0.48   
H0: b7  = b8 = b9 = 0  
(upper tail area) 
0.98    0.30    0.05    0.01    0.40    0.80   
c                                 (b0)  -32.95    -355.26  ***  -250.73  ***  72.98    -115.71    -241.88  ** 
Yi                              (b1)  1.33  ***  3.10    4.69  ***  -1.19    2.47  *  3.77  * 
Yj                              (b2)  1.09  ***  7.94  ***  4.09  ***  0.00    2.16    4.62  ** 
DFi                            (b3)  -0.04    -5.33  *  -2.43    1.68    -2.30    -3.16   
DFj                            (b4)  -0.81    -3.48    -6.68  **  -0.47    -1.47    -5.95   
Yi/Li                          (b5)  -0.69  ***  -    -    0.25    -    -   
Yj/Lj                          (b6)  -0.45  ***  -    -    -0.39  **  -    -   
Ipi                              (b7)  -    -    -    -2.13    -    -   
Epj                            (b8)  -    -    -    1.27    -    -   
Excij                          (b9)  -    -    -    -0.12    -    -   
Dij                            (b10)  -0.77  *  5.46  ***  2.88  ***  -1.89    0.28    3.07  * 
STDCAN                   (b11)  -1.22  **  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.        n.a.   
INSPCAN                  (b12)  -2.78  **  -0.54    n.a.    n.a.        n.a.   
LABCAN                   (b13)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.        n.a.   
STDUS                      (b14)  0.66  ***  n.a.      §  §      §  n.a.   
INSPUS                    (b15)  0.10    3.57  ***  0.07   §  2.26  ***  0.26  §  0.55   
LABUS                     (b16)  0.16  **  n.a.    -0.53  ***  n.a.    -0.33  **  n.a.   
STDMEX                   (b17)  0.32  ***  9.25  **  1.31  ***  -0.53  *  -0.50    4.97  *** 
INSPMEX                  (b18)  0.09    -10.85  ***  n.a.    0.54    1.88  **  -4.99  *** 
LABMEX                  (b19)  0.03    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    0.33    -0.13   
Estimation  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression 
§ The estimated coefficient represents the join effect of product standard and testing, inspection requirements.  
***, ** and * indicate respectively a significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%.   17 
Table 2. Estimated results 
  HS06  HS 07  HS 08  HS 09  HS 10  HS11 
Product Category  Live tree and other 
plants; cut flowers  Edible vegetables  Edible fruits and 
nuts  Coffee, tea and spices  Cereals  Malt; starches; inulin; 
wheat gluten 
Obs  250    1218    1051    611    301    588   
R
2  0.36    0.18    0.22    0.19    0.27    0.26   
H0: pooled vs panel  
(upper tail area)  0.72    0.95    0.39    0.93    0.91    0.12   
H0: b3 = b4 =0  
(upper tail area) 
0.01    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.27    0.24   
H0: b7  = b8 = b9 = 0  
(upper tail area) 
0.75    0.00    0.00    0.20    0.92    0.10   
c                                 (b0)  -6.49    -33.92    18.04    -21.36    -37.07    -205.88  *** 
Yi                               (b1)  3.13    2.74    1.02    1.55    2.42    3.18  *** 
Yj                              (b2)  0.65    0.33    0.45    1.17    0.52    3.90  *** 
DFi                            (b3)  -3.09    -2.07    0.35    -1.77    -1.28    0.90   
DFj                            (b4)  -0.73    2.41    1.15    -0.69    -1.75    -5.57  ** 
Yi/Li                          (b5)  -2.35    -0.59  **  -0.70  ***  -0.75  ***  -    -   
Yj/Lj                          (b6)  -1.12  **  -1.26  ***  -2.44  ***  -0.98  ***  -    -   
Ipi                              (b7)  -    -1.50    1.55    -    -    -   
Epj                            (b8)  -    -0.73    0.51    -    -    -   
Excij                          (b9)  -    0.68    0.42    -    -    -   
Dij                            (b10)  -2.62    -1.18    -2.17    -1.35    -2.09    1.79   
STDCAN                   (b11)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
INSPCAN                  (b12)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
LABCAN                   (b13)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
STDUS                      (b14)  -3.49    2.77  ***    §  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
INSPUS                    (b15)  n.a.    -1.85  ***  0.09  §  -2.01  ***  n.a.    n.a.   
LABUS                     (b16)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
STDMEX                   (b17)  1.44  **  0.66  ***  -0.36  ***  0.67  ***  -0.42    0.29   
INSPMEX                  (b18)  -1.02    0.15    0.30    0.12    5.21  ***  0.74  *** 
LABMEX                   (b19)  -1.22  **  -0.71  ***  -0.04    -0.02    -0.76  ***  -0.21   
Estimation  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression 
§ The estimated coefficient represents the join effect of product standard and testing, inspection requirements.  
***, ** and * indicate respectively a significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%.   18 
 
Table 3. Estimated results 
  HS 12  HS13  HS 14  HS 15  HS 16  HS 17 
Product Category  Oil seed, oleag. fruits  Lac; gums, resins  Vegetable plaiting 
materials 
Animal/vegetable 
fats and oil 
Prep. of meat and 
fish 
Sugars and sugar 
confectionery 
Obs  697    204    143    805    504    325   
R
2  0.11    0.29    0.20    0.18    0.27    0.26   
H0: pooled vs panel  
(upper tail area)  0.98    0.48    0.95    0.81    0.90    0.82   
H0: b3 = b4 =0  
(upper tail area) 
0.70    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.07   
H0: b7  = b8 = b9 = 0  
(upper tail area) 
0.38    0.07    0.13    0.40    0.19    0.47   
c                                     (b0)  -11.90    -198.49    -49.22    28.24    -47.54    -245.87  ** 
Yi                                  (b1)  0.03    3.76  *  1.78    -0.26    5.45    4.08  ** 
Yj                                  (b2)  1.03    4.48  *  1.72    1.03    -0.10    4.71  *** 
DFi                               (b3)  1.46    -0.70    3.42    1.42    -0.26    -4.93  * 
DFj                               (b4)  -1.95    -4.10    -3.58    -0.01    -0.96    -6.61  * 
Yi/Li                             (b5)  -    -1.23  ***  -1.25  ***  -0.80  ***  -3.18    -   
Yj/Lj                             (b6)  -    -1.70  ***  -2.01  ***  -0.97  ***  -1.17  ***  -   
Ipi                                 (b7)  -    -    -    -    -    -   
Epj                                (b8)  -    -    -    -    -    -   
Excij                             (b9)  -    -    -    -    -    -   
Dij                                (b10)  -0.40    1.26    -0.49    -1.83    -3.31    3.40  ** 
STDCAN                       (b11)  -0.99    0.01    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
INSPCAN                     (b12)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
LABCAN                      (b13)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
STDUS                         (b14)  1.14    1.73  **  n.a.    n.a.    §    §   
INSPUS                        (b15)  0.93  ***  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    -5.10    4.46  *** 
LABUS                         (b16)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    -0.63  ***  n.a.   
STDMEX                      (b17)  0.36    -0.19    -1.27  **  -2.34  ***  -1.94  ***  0.24   
INSPMEX                     (b18)  -0.26    0.18    -0.52  *  3.02  ***  2.61  ***  n.a.   
LABMEX                      (b19)  -0.24    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    1.18  ***  -0.12   
Estimation  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression 
***, ** and * indicate respectively a significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%.   19 
Table 4. Estimated results 
  HS 18  HS 19  HS20  HS 21, at 6-digi  HS 22 
Product Category  Cocoa and cocoa 
preparations 
Prep.of cereal, flour, 
starch/milk; 
pastrycook prod. 




Beverages, sprits and 
vinegar 
Obs  232    361    942    376    459   
R
2  0.41    0.37    0.27    0.31    0.27   
H0: pooled vs panel  
(upper tail area)  0.96    0.76    0.59    0.46    0.84   
H0: b3 = b4 =0  
(upper tail area) 
0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
H0: b7  = b8 = b9 = 0  
(upper tail area) 
0.00    0.01    0.00    0.11    0.10   
c                               (b0)  -28.90    8.39    -65.26    39.28    -237.77  * 
Yi                             (b1)  -2.53    8.77    3.58    7.27    4.53  ** 
Yj                             (b2)  6.17    3.61    2.79    -2.29    4.62  ** 
DFi                           (b3)  2.49    9.19    0.84    -1.21    -2.63   
DFj                           (b4)  -3.63    -8.12    -1.77    2.48    -3.21   
Yi/Li                         (b5)  -1.17  ***  -18.15  **  -5.22    -6.53    -1.31  *** 
Yj/Lj                         (b6)  -1.65  ***  -2.30  ***  -1.72  ***  -1.71  ***  -0.90  *** 
Ipi                             (b7)  -0.72    9.94    2.09    -    -   
Epj                            (b8)  1.48    3.66    1.39    -    -   
Excij                         (b9)  -4.10    -9.73    -1.93    -    -   
Dij                            (b10)  -2.54    -13.57  **  -3.06    -5.99  *  2.08   
STDCAN                    (b11)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
INSPCAN                   (b12)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
LABCAN                    (b13)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
STDUS                       (b14)  n.a.      §  §  §    §  n.a.   
INSPUS                      (b15)  n.a.    -38.54  § *  -8.74  §  -12.92  §  n.a.   
LABUS                       (b16)  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    -0.73  *** 
STDMEX                     (b17)  4.84  ***  -1.78  ***  0.67  **  -1.02  **  -2.53  *** 
INSPMEX                    (b18)  0.28  *  1.98  ***  n.a.    2.01  ***  9.30  *** 
LABMEX                     (b19)  -4.64  ***  1.72  ***  -0.72  **  0.81  ***  0.10   
Estimation  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression  pooled regression 
§ The estimated coefficient represents the join effect of product standard and testing, inspection requirements.  
***, ** and * indicate respectively a significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%.   20 
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